

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Reginald M. Gilliam, # 240636,)	C/A No. 4:13-645-RBH-TER
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	
vs.)	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
)	
Greenwood Professional Investigations Inc., and)	
Mr. Ronnie McCallister,)	
)	
Respondents.)	
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A Petition, captioned “Notice of Appeal,” was submitted to the court *pro se* by a state prison inmate. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and D.S.C. Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(c), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such *pro se* cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § § 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

BACKGROUND

Reginald M. Gilliam (“Petitioner”) sued Respondents in one of the state trial courts in Greenwood County. His complaint was dismissed by the Administrative Judge because his summons had twenty days, instead of thirty, written on it as the time for Respondents to answer. Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court decision on January 30, 2013. The remittitur was sent to the trial court on February 21, 2013. On March 12, 2013, Petitioner filed this case using a document captioned “Notice of Appeal,” but with this court listed on the top of the page as the court of filing. Petitioner asks this court to order the

South Carolina Court of Appeals to send his case back to the trial court for further proceedings, or, in effect, to overturn and reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals so that his case against Respondents can go forward. The pleading submitted to open this case was liberally construed and docketed as a petition for writ of mandamus because it asks this court to direct the state appellate court to perform a specific act: reverse the trial court's dismissal of Petitioner's complaint.

INITIAL REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* Petition filed in this case. The review was conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr.*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

This court is required to construe *pro se* petitions liberally. Such *pro se* petitions are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a petition filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* petition the petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. *De'Lonta v. Angelone*, 330 F. 3d 630, 630n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

DISCUSSION

The proceedings and rulings made in the Greenwood County trial court and/or the South Carolina Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed or set aside by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in this case. *See D. C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.).¹ *See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This prohibition on review of state court orders by federal district courts is commonly referred to as the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine or the *Feldman-Rooker* doctrine. *See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. 280 (2005); *Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transport.*, 434 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 2006); *Ivy Club v. Edwards*, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1991). Because the *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine is jurisdictional it may be raised by the court *sua sponte*. *American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell*, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). According to the Fourth Circuit, “the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court’s decision itself.” *Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp.*, 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006).

Longstanding precedents preclude the United States District Court for the District of South

¹ Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court. Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only *the Supreme Court of the United States* may review a decision of a state’s highest court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (since 1988, such Supreme Court review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right); *see Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs.*, 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997). In civil, criminal, and other cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that were properly brought before it under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 or that statute's predecessors. *E.g., Lucas v. S. C. Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1991) (an example of a South Carolina Supreme Court case that was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court).

Carolina from reviewing the findings or rulings made by the South Carolina state courts. The *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues. *See Arthur v. Supreme Ct. of Iowa*, 709 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Iowa 1989).

Petitioner's submission of the initial pleading in this case, captioned "Notice of Appeal," shows that Petitioner is attempting to have this court review the proceedings that took place before the Greenwood County trial court and the South Carolina Court of Appeals. *See Anderson v. Colorado*, 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986)("[I]t is well settled that federal district courts are without authority to review state court judgments where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review."); *see also Hagerty v. Succession of Clement*, 749 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1984)(collecting cases). Petitioner is claiming that he was injured by the state court decisions, *see Willner v. Frey*, No. 06-1432, 2007 WL 222778 (4th Cir. August 3, 2007), and to rule in his favor would, necessarily, require this court to overrule (or otherwise find invalid) various orders and rulings made in both the Greenwood County trial court and the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Such a result is prohibited under the *Rooker-Feldman* Doctrine. *Davani*, 434 F.3d at 719-20; *see Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.*, 544 U.S. at 293-94; *Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va.*, 122 F.3d at 201.

Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner asks this court to direct the state Court of Appeals to reverse its decision in his appeal, it seeks mandamus relief against state officials or employees. *See Black's Law Dictionary* (8th ed. 2004) (mandamus: "A writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly.") Accordingly, Petitioner's pleading was liberally construed as a Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

Circuit precedents teach that a writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy. The writ of mandamus is infrequently used by federal courts, and its use is usually limited to cases where a federal court is acting in aid of its own jurisdiction. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1361; *Gurley v. Superior Ct. of Mecklenburg County*, 411 F.2d 586, 587-88 & nn. 2-4 (4th Cir. 1969). A federal district court may issue a writ of mandamus only against an employee or official *of the United States*, not against a state employee or official. *Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb County Sup. Court*, 474 F.2d 1275, 1275-76 (5th Cir.1973) (federal courts do not have original jurisdiction over mandamus actions to compel an officer or employee *of a state* to perform a duty owed to the petitioner); *see also In re Campbell*, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (same; collecting cases); *In re Carr*, 803 F.2d 1180, 1180 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished opinion) (same). Because the relief requested would require this court to direct state officials to do something they would not ordinarily do, the Petition submitted is frivolous.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Petition in this case be dismissed *without prejudice*.

Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

s/Thomas E. Rogers, III
Thomas E. Rogers, III
United States Magistrate Judge

May 15, 2013
Florence, South Carolina

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).